Firms cash management, adjustment cost and its impact on firms’ speed of adjustment: a cross country analysis by Amin, Qazi Awais & Williamson, Tom
Vol.:(0123456789)




Firms cash management, adjustment cost and its impact 
on firms’ speed of adjustment: a cross country analysis
Qazi Awais Amin1 · Tom Williamson1
Published online: 8 May 2020 
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020
Abstract
We investigate the firms’ specific attributes that determine the difference in speed of adjust-
ment (SOA) towards the cash holdings target in the Scandinavian countries: Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. We examine whether Scandinavian firms maintain an optimal level 
of cash holdings and determine if the active cash holdings management is associated with 
the firms’ higher SOA and lower adjustment costs. Our findings substantiate that a higher 
level of off-target cost induces professional managers to rebalance their cash level towards 
the optimal balance of cash holdings. Our results reveal that Scandinavian firms accelerate 
SOA towards cash targets primarily for the precautionary motive. Moreover, our results 
show that SOA is heterogeneous across Scandinavian firms based on adjustment cost and 
deviate cash holdings towards the target mainly with the support of internal financing. Fur-
thermore, our empirical findings show that the SOA of Norwegian firms is significantly 
higher than the Danish and Swedish firms.
Keywords Cash holdings · Speed of adjustment · Trade-off theory · Scandinavian 
countries · GMM
JEL Classification G30 · G32
1 Introduction
Managing cash has recently been a vital managerial decision for the optimal utilization of 
corporation funds (Megginson et al. 2014). The decision to accumulate or deploy cash in 
excess of cash level for business operations and ongoing contractual obligations are at the 
discretion of professional managers. The extant literature suggests that the risk of inad-
equate cash and cost of excess cash should be balancing to regulate the cash levels. Recent 
empirical evidence shows that firms hold a substantial and increasing part of their assets 
as cash. The literature widely documents why firms manage excess cash balance, hence, 
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have reported several explanations, however, limited research has evaluated firms’ speed of 
adjustment (SOA) towards the target cash holdings.
The substantial increase in the firms’ cash holdings in the US market, the financial 
downturns of large business groups and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, all make 
it important to understand the dynamics of firms’ cash management (Bates et  al. 2009). 
In general, firms give preference to cash over debt to finance their short-term investment 
projects before issuing new equity (Brick and Liao 2017). The determinants of firms’ 
cash holdings have extensively discussed in prior literature particularly in the US context 
(e.g., Bates et al. 2009; Bates et al. 2018; Dittmar and Duchin 2010; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith 2007; Gao et al. 2013; Harford et al. 2008; Nikolov and Whited 2014; Opler et al. 
1999) while in the global firms context (e.g., Dittmar et al. 2003; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; 
Nguyen 2018).
The extant literature has primarily examined two aspects of firms’ cash holdings: the 
level of cash holdings (e.g., Bates et al. 2009; Foley et al. 2007; Lee and Lee 2009; Opler 
et al. 1999) and the valuation of cash level (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Faulk-
ender and Wang 2006; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; Orlova et al. 2017; Pinkowitz et al. 2006). 
However, there is limited empirical research on cash holdings speed of adjustment (see, 
for example, Dittmar and Duchin 2010; Guariglia and Yang 2018; Orlova and Rao 2018). 
Importantly, these studies are in the US and Chines context and the empirical findings of 
these studies are contradictory and inconclusive. For example, Dittmar and Duchin (2010) 
find a slower adjustment speed across several decades and conclude that on average cash 
deficit firms are slower than cash surplus firms. On the other hand, Orlova and Rao (2018) 
used a data set of US firms and examine the sensitivity of cash holdings SOA towards 
the size and sign of deviation from target cash holdings and report that firms with cash 
deficit and financial surplus have slow adjustment speed. Moreover, using a panel of 1478 
Chinese listed firms Guariglia and Yang (2018) conclude that firms with a greater level 
of excess cash have higher adjustment speed. Brick and Liao (2017) take into considera-
tion the firms’ different level of excess cash holdings and linked it with diverse adjustment 
cost. It is noticeable that the aforementioned limited empirical research of SOA focuses on 
the US and Chinese framework and report inconclusive results. Moreover, the governance 
structure, institutional mechanism and legal framework of China and US differ from the 
European market. Further, it is important to examine the dynamics of cash holding SOA in 
the European context for a better understanding of factor affecting firms’ SOA. Therefore, 
limited research of cash holdings SOA creates a research gap to conduct a comprehensive 
study to understand the dynamics of cash holdings SOA in the Scandinavian framework.
Scandinavian context is an interesting setting to understand the dynamics of cash hold-
ings SOA. The Scandinavian countries belong to the common Scandinavian civil law and 
characterized by relatively greater investor protection and domination of family and for-
eign ownership compared to other civil law countries. La Porta et  al. (1998) document 
that Scandinavian countries are deemed to be considered the member of a relatively homo-
geneous group in term of corporate governance mechanism. The Scandinavian common 
law suggests a supervisory board which manage the appointment of managers and take 
the firms key decisions. Moreover, the most significant feature of Scandinavian boards is 
the appointment of employee representation. The corporate employees are entitled to have 
one-third representation in board decision making which helps to support the sense of soli-
darity and minimize management and employees’ conflicts. Based on the aforementioned 
distinct institutional and governance mechanism we conjecture that the cash management 
approach of the Scandinavian market tends to differ from those in other markets particu-
larly the US and Chines context.
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We contribute to the literature by investigating the firm-specific attributes that deter-
mine the difference in firms’ speed SOA towards the cash holdings target across Scandi-
navian countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden. To our knowledge no prior study 
has examined the cash holdings SOA in the Scandinavian countries context. To this end, 
we employ a panel of 749 non-financial listed firms over the period of 2000–2016. In doing 
so, at the first stage, we split the sample into high cash firms and low cash firms and inves-
tigate their SOA and cash adjustment period in terms of half-life.
We then determine whether country-specific attributes significantly influence the firms’ 
SOA and examine if the firms are heterogeneous in terms of SOA across Denmark, Nor-
way, and Sweden, a thus-far overlooked aspect of SOA in the Scandinavian countries’ con-
text. In addition, we investigate whether SOA differs in terms of higher/lower cash levels, 
leverage financing and investment levels. Moreover, we explore the effectiveness of firms’ 
cash management policies against financial constraints by categorizing firms as  financially 
constrained (FC) and unconstrained (UC) across four different constraints indices.
Finally, we determine the efficacy of Scandinavian firms in managing cash level and its 
SOA across pre-financial crisis and post-financial crisis and investigate whether there is a 
regime shift in the Scandinavian firms demand function of cash holding in response to the 
financial crisis. More specifically, we test the firms’ contingency approach of cash manage-
ment towards the optimal level of cash holdings in response to the exogenous financial 
shock, relative to the cash management in more routine, steady-state and stable economic 
conditions.
Plentiful literature has discussed the trade-off theory and financial hierarchy theory to 
develop cash holdings model (see, for example, Bates et al. (2018), Bigelli and Sanchez-
Vidal (2012), Dittmar et al. (2003), Dittmar and Duchin (2010), Gao et al. (2013), Guar-
iglia and Yang (2018), Harford (1999), Jiang and Lie (2016), Lian et al. (2012), Orlova and 
Rao (2018) and Venkiteshwaran (2011), while the literature pertinent to the firms’ SOA 
is inconclusive and still in the developing stage. We test both theoretical approaches e.g., 
trade-off and financial hierarchy theories in the Scandinavian countries context and link 
our empirical model with the precautionary and speculative motives of cash holdings.
Our core findings advocate the view that Scandinavian firms are not persistent across 
high cash firms and cash deficit firms, hence, adjust their cash balance towards an opti-
mal level of cash holdings for the precautionary motive. Our results reveal an imperfect 
and continuous deviation of Scandinavians firms cash holdings towards the target with an 
adjustment speed of (0.428). This SOA is significantly lower than US firms (0.540) docu-
ment by Orlova and Rao (2018) while its marginally close to the global sample of Dittmar 
and Duchin (2010) who document SOA ranging between (0.353) and (0.433). Moreover, 
our results report that Scandinavians firms covering cash adjustment period of half-life 
ranging between (1.386) and (1.619) years. Our empirical findings show that the SOA of 
Norwegian firms is significantly higher than the Danish and Swedish firms due to the sta-
ble cash holdings level. Our analysis substantiates that financially constrained (FC) firms 
cover their transaction cost for unconditional liquidity, and relatively sensitive than uncon-
strained (UC) firms towards the optimal cash level, and quickly deviate their cash towards 
the target. Moreover, we report that Scandinavian firms prefer to hold more cash during the 
post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period for the transactional and precautionary 
motives which lead to a faster SOA. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provided 
literature review and hypothesis development. Section  3 describes the data and research 
strategy, Sect. 4 presents the various model estimations and results analysis, while Sect. 5 
concludes the findings.
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2  Cash holdings theories
The extant literature has mainly discussed two theories of cash holdings such as trade-
off theory and financial hierarchy theory (Bates et al. 2018; Dittmar et al. 2003; Dittmar 
and Duchin 2010; Ferreira and Vilela 2004; Gao et  al. 2013; Guariglia and Yang 2018, 
Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). The trade-off theory explains two motives of 
firm cash holdings such as transaction motive and the precautionary motive (Jun and Jen 
2003). The transaction motive recommends firms to maintain an adequate level of cash 
holdings as the borrowing from the capital market are comparatively more expensive. The 
precautionary motive suggests that firms may reduce investments during the period of cash 
shortage and hold cash for precautionary needs (Kim et al. 1998; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). 
In addition, the trade-off theory argues that firms prefer an optimal level of cash reserve by 
developing a balance between marginal cost and marginal benefits. Trade-off theory pre-
dicts that most of the firms prefer to actively deviate cash holdings towards optimal cash 
levels, however, firms need to be trade-off the adjustment costs against the cost of operat-
ing below the optimal level of cash holdings (off-target costs). Therefore, firms’ SOA is 
directly associated with adjustment costs. For example, if the adjustment cost is zero, firms 
can maintain optimal cash level while in the case of higher adjustment costs (e.g., costs of 
external borrowing and financial constraints), it’s harder for firms to re-adjust their cash 
balance towards optimal cash target.
The static notion of trade-off theory predicts a quicker adjustment towards cash tar-
get, while the dynamic approach of trade-off model takes into consideration other factors 
such as adjustments costs and market frictions that tend to slow down the SOA towards 
cash targets. Most of the cash holdings literature plagued with econometric issues such as 
endogeneity and simultaneity and develop their hypothesis based on static models (see, for 
example, Kim et al. 1998; Martinez-Sola et al. 2018; Opler et al. 1999). The static trade-off 
model is unable to fully account for adjustment cost and off-target cost, while the dynamic 
trade-off model provides more consistent estimation by considering all relevant adjustment 
cost for optimal cash level. Therefore, the present study employed both estimation version 
e.g. dynamic and static techniques for model estimation to determine SOA across sample 
firms.
A large strand of studies documents that firms hold cash more than their operational 
and investment requirements (see, for example, Ditmar and Smith 2007; Bates et al. 2009). 
Moreover, Bates et al. (2009) report that the cash ratio of US firms become more than dou-
ble from 1980 to 2006. The possible reasons for large firms’ cash holdings are the trans-
actional motive, precautionary motive, research & development and investment opportuni-
ties. The agency theory predicts that there is a conflict between shareholders and managers 
and there is a possibility that managers hold more cash to peruse their personal interest 
(Harford et al. 2008).
The firms hold more cash for the transaction and precautionary motives to protect them-
selves when they expect future cash flow uncertainty or high costs of external financing 
(Han and Qiu 2007). Agency theory predicts that the countries where shareholder protec-
tion are not strong, firms prefer to hold more cash (Pinkowitz et al. 2006). Moreover, when 
agency problems are severe then the value of cash holdings is worth-less. The self-cen-
tred managers are more likely to hoard cash, rather making dividend payments. Moreover, 
Jensen (1986), argues that firms with agency problems tend to hoard cash when there is a 
lack of investment opportunities and the self-centred managers do not want to return cash 
to shareholders.
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On the other hand, the financial hierarchy theory is not suggesting an optimal level of 
cash and focus on the balance between investment needs and retained earnings (Myers and 
Majluf 1984). The financial hierarchy theory portrays a hierarchy of source of funds by 
suggesting that finance can be generated from retained earnings, internal debt and equity. 
In addition, financial hierarchy theory posits that the level of cash holdings depends upon 
capital needs for investment opportunities without having an optimal level of cash hold-
ings. Therefore, shareholders are ready to accept a high level of cash holdings to get benefit 
from potential investments opportunities if their interest is protected by effective corporate 
governance. Moreover, financial hierarchy theory argues that the firms prefer to hold cash 
when external resources are expensive and go beyond the firms’ affordability compared 
to internal resources. Opler et al. (1999) document that financial hierarchy theory consid-
ers asymmetric information as a primary issue of effective decision making because the 
external funds become costly for the firms due to asymmetric information, consequently 
firms prefer to utilize retained earnings to avoid external financing. Furthermore, the prior 
studies such as Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) rely on single period trade-off to 
determine the cash level between the costs and benefits of firms’ liquid assets. In contrast 
to the prior studies, we estimate both the theoretical models i.e. trade-off and financially 
hierarchy model to determine the relevance of the Scandinavian countries’ context.
Several prior studies in the UK and USA context substantiated that firms cash hold-
ings policies are influenced by the trade-off model (see, for example, Kim et al. 1998; Han 
and Qiu 2007; Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004; Venkiteshwaran 2011). There-
fore, based on prior the studies’ findings we expect that Scandinavian firms’ cash holdings 
are better explained by trade-off theory. Therefore, following the theoretical framework of 
Opler et al. (1999), we developed our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1 Cash holdings strategies of Scandinavian firms are better defined by the 
trade-off model compared to the financial hierarchy model.
3  Literature review
The optimal level of cash holdings is less likely to be focused in the perfect capital market 
as the firms have easy access to external funds and invest in potential investment opportu-
nities, particularly when the firms’ internal funds are not enough for investment. In addi-
tion, firms tend to optimize and adjust their level of cash reserve in response to the macro-
level changes in the economy. Moreover, inflation and interest rate are the common factors 
which directly associated with the purchasing power of the firms and directly impact on 
their cash holdings.
The optimal cash holdings level is irrelevant in the perfect capital market as firms have 
easy access to external funds to invest in potential investment opportunities whenever 
internal funds are insufficient for investment. Moreover, firms have indifferent behaviour 
in relation to internal and external financing. (Myers and Majluf 1984). Furthermore, firms 
subject to greater imperfections tend to hold more cash as it enhances firms’ ability to initi-
ate profitable investment when they face a shortage of internal funds and external finance 
is too costly. However, it is recognised that a higher level of cash holding associate with 
costs.
Two versions are reported in the literature to manage the unobserved cash holdings tar-
get. First, Opler et al. (1999) suggest that cash holdings target can measure by taking the 
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mean or the moving average of the observed cash ratio. This approach based on the weak 
assumption that target cash level depends on firms’ past cash holdings level and remain 
consistent over time. The second version states that cash holdings target is deemed to be a 
specific ratio derived from firms’ characteristics (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 2008. 
The present study examines both the version in the Scandinavian context.
A large strand of studies document that firms higher level of cash holding is useful in 
mitigating cash shortfall and enhance firm access to profitable investment opportunities 
(e.g., Almeida et al. 2004; Chen et al. 2012; Harford et al. 2008; Opler et al. 1999; Riddick 
and Whited 2009). Kim et al. (1998) reveal that firms prefer to hold a higher level of cash 
holdings to maintain financial flexibility to manage unexpected market shock. Venkitesh-
waran (2011) examines a sample of US manufacturing firms and report that adjustment of 
excess cash firms is slower than low cash firms while at faster deviation of small size firms 
than large size firms.
The concurrent studies such as Fischer et al. (1989) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) 
point out that firms rebalance their target level of leverage when adjustment cost is lower 
than the non-adjustment cost (off-target cost). In a similar vein, this argument can be exam-
ined in the context of the target level of cash holdings as the primary source of adjustment 
cost is the transaction costs associated with the distribution of cash to shareholders and the 
cost of raising capital to maintain the cash holdings target. Accordingly, we take into con-
sideration the adjustment cost and off-target cost of firms’ optimal cash level to investigate 
whether Scandinavian firms rebalance their cash holding towards optimal cash level.
The cash holdings deviation towards the target level is directly associated with the 
firms’ adjustment costs which depend on firms’ specific characteristics and the level of 
financial market imperfection. Therefore, firms’ SOA link with adjustment costs and its 
individual attributes in relation to firm capacity to manage cash holdings level. Therefore, 
a higher adjustment cost affects the firms’ efficiency to adjust cash levels and, consequently 
slow down the SOA. On the other hand, firms suffer off-target costs when professional 
managers unable to maintain an optimal level of cash holdings. A higher level of off-target 
cost induces firms to review their cash policy to adjust their cash balance towards the opti-
mal level of cash holdings. We, therefore, argue that cash level and adjustment costs play 
a significant role in determining the Scandinavian firms’ cash holdings SOA. Hence, we 
hypothesize:
Hypothesis H2 The difference in financial constraints levels and adjustment costs lead to 
different levels of cash holdings SOA.
Almeida et  al. (2004) document that when the firms have enough financial worth to 
acquire the first available profitable investment opportunity during the financial crisis and 
in stable economic conditions are considered as unconstrained (UC) firms. In contrast, 
financially constrained (FC) firms are relatively small, young and face more financial fric-
tion when borrowing finance from the capital market. We, therefore, take into considera-
tion the determinants of cash holdings and postulate that FC firms prefer internal finance 
due to the limited access to external financial resources and tend to hold a higher level of 
cash holdings. Furthermore, FC firms are more focused to meet their precautionary motive 
and less concerned about potential investment opportunities (Opler et  al. 1999). Moreo-
ver, UC firms have more financial worth than FC firms which allow them to acquire the 
first available profitable investment opportunity (Almeida et  al. 2004). The prior stream 
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of literature classify firms as FC and UC based on different constraints criteria such as the 
firms capacity to access capital markets, bond rating, firm size, dividend payment, payout 
ratio, leverage, WW index, collateral assets and life cycle (see, for example, Almeida et al. 
2004; Chang et al. 2017; Chan et al. 2012; Denis and Sibilkov 2010; Lee and Park 2016; 
Martinez-Sola et al. 2018).
We investigate the impacts of financial constraints on firms’ cash holdings and their 
SOA by categorizing firms as financially constrained (FC) and unconstrained (UC) firms 
based on four different constraint indices and tests the effectiveness of firms’ cash man-
agement policies against financial constraints.1 These constraints criteria are dividend 
payment, firm size, firms’ growth and interest coverage ratio which helps to measure the 
firms’ financial constraints. Moreover, the firms’ precautionary and speculative motives are 
directly associated with financial constraints. Han and Qiu (2007) document that finan-
cially constrained (FC) firms prefer to hold more cash for precautionary motive particularly 
in the situation of volatile cash flows to minimise financing cost and to avoid bankruptcy. 
In the case of speculative motive, firms prefer to hold larger cash to compete for their 
industrial rivals by acquiring potential investment opportunities. We, therefore, argue that 
the consideration of precautionary and speculative motives makes the professional man-
agers of FC firms more sensitive towards cash shortage. In addition, we conjecture that 
financial constraints significantly influence firms’ cash holdings policies which affect SOA, 
therefore, we expect that the firms’ SOA is highly sensitive to financial constraints. Hence, 
we hypothesize:
Hypothesis H3 SOA of financially constrained (FC) firms is more sensitive to optimal 
cash levels than unconstrained (UC) firms.
The firms maintain an adequate level of cash holdings to secure against unexpected 
market slump and credit shocks to avoid expensive external borrowing. Venkiteshwaran 
(2011) documents that imperfect capital market impact negatively on the maintaining of 
the optimal level of cash holdings. Baum et al. (2006) point out that macroeconomic fac-
tors of financial crisis tend to influence the firms’ cash holdings targets. Moreover, the 
financial crisis negatively impacts on firms’ profitability, cash flows which in turn reduce 
the expected return on investment (Arslan-Ayaydin et  al. 2014; Kwak et  al. 2012). In 
addition, the financial crisis affects the capital markets functioning which limit the firms’ 
access to external borrowing, therefore, firms tend to face the shortage of cash flow prob-
lems. Further, we argue that the countries where corporate governance mechanism is not 
followed in the true sense, firms are not a risk-taker. Therefore, during financial crisis firms 
have relatively less access to profitable investment opportunities and face more financial 
distress and as a result, prefer to hold more cash. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) reveal that 
during the financial crisis, firms prefer to increase their level of cash holdings to reduce 
their default risk. Santos (2011) report that the banks reduce their credit in response to the 
1 We categorise firms as financially constrained (FC) and unconstrained (UC) if they are below (above) of 
industry median in term of total assets for firm size criteria, and take 1 if firms pay the dividend, and 0 oth-
erwise. For growth and interest coverage ratio criteria, sample firms are classified as FC and UC if firms are 
above (below) of industry median of sample firms. Based on these classifications, the non-dividend paying 
firms, small size firms, low growth firms, and low-interest coverage ratio firms are categorised as FC firms 
otherwise, UC firms. For growth criteria, firms’ growth defines as an increase in the firm’s annual sale com-
pares to the preceding year. Previous studies such as Han and Qiu (2007) use ‘Bond rating’ and ‘CP rating’ 
while Almeida et al. (2004) use paper rating to classify firms as financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. We ignore these criteria because of data limitations.
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financial crisis which increases the firms’ cost of external financing while Belghitar and 
Khan (2013) argue that increased cash holding is helpful in minimizing the intensity of the 
financial crisis.
Kahle and Stulz (2013) argue that firms which depending on external financing during 
stable economic conditions are more likely be affected during crisis whilst the firms which 
do not rely on credit market would be less affected during the crisis period. Dittmar and 
Duchin (2010) report that financially constrained firms are more affected by the financial 
crisis as they reduce the investment projects and increase their level of cash holdings in 
response to high risk and asymmetric information.
The extant literature develops a model of cash holdings by considering transactional 
motives and discuss the variation in cross-sectional firms’ cash holdings mainly for US 
firms (Song and Lee 2012). The firms prefer to hold less cash holdings when the opportu-
nity cost of money is higher and willing to hold more cash when they have a higher trans-
action cost to convert non-cash assets into cash. In the pre-crisis period, the firms enjoy 
an abundance of profitable investment opportunities due to higher financial stability and 
large volume of business. In contrast, during the financial crisis period firms have limited 
investments opportunities due to the lower rate of return and the depression in economy. 
Therefore, the same hypothesis may not be generalized for both samples i.e. pre-crisis and 
during crisis period.
The present study classifies the sample observations across the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
period as the access to external finance is likely to be limited during the post-crisis period 
due to the market imperfection. Moreover, when the financial crisis hit firms’ cash holdings 
below or above the optimal level, one would expect a quicker SOA to rebalance the cash 
holdings towards the target. In doing so, we take into consideration the firms’ characteris-
tics that capture the difference in observed SOA across the pre-crisis and post-crisis period. 
Based on the above discussion we develop our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis H4 Firms SOA towards an optimal level of cash holdings during the post-
crisis period is quicker than the pre-crisis period.
4  Research strategy
4.1  Data and sample
We use a sample of 749 non-financial listed firms of Scandinavian countries such as Den-
mark, Norway and Sweden over the period 2000–2016 to conduct our empirical analysis. 
The sample develops mainly from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database. In addition, 
Financial industries (SIC codes, 6000–6999) and Utilities (SIC codes, 4900–4999) are 
excluded subject to differences in the applicable regulatory requirements of the individual 
countries. Firms with missing data during the sample period are excluded from the sample 
while observations are dropped if the value of firms’ cash holdings and total assets is miss-
ing. This results in an unbalanced panel data set of 11,842 firm-years observations. Fur-
thermore, the variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
Panel A of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the variable used in this study. The 
cash holding is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. The mean (median) of 
cash holdings is 12.7% (9.6%) which is less than the cash holdings of US firms of 16.5% 
in 2000 to 20% in 2012. In addition, these cash holdings ratios of Scandinavian firms are 
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slightly greater than UK firms (10%), reported by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) while less than 
Chines firms (14.7%) and US firms (16%) document by Guariglia and Yang (2018) and 
Opler et al. (1999), respectively. Moreover, Tobin’s Q is determined by the market to book 
ratio and the mean (median) of Tobin’s Q is 1.637 (1.231). The leverage defines as the ratio 
of total debt to total assets with the mean (median) value of 24.3% (20.2%). The net work-
ing capital (NWC) is explained as NWC minus cash and short-term investment to total 
assets. The mean (median) of NWC ratio is 2.9% (2.4%). The cash flow is 9.4% (5.1%) 
which is calculated as the ratio of EBIT plus depreciation to total assets. Capital expendi-
ture defines as the ratio of capital expenditures scaled by total assets. The mean and median 
of capital expenditure is 5.6% (4.9%). The firm size is 15.44% (13.39%) which is deter-
mined by taking the log of firms’ total assets. A dummy variable is used if firms pay the 
dividend in a given year by taking 1 and 0 otherwise. The firms’ risk is measured by taking 
industry average standard deviation of cash flow which is considered as industry sigma 
(cash flow volatility). The mean (median) of industry sigma is 4.7% (3.9%).
Panel B of Table 1 presents the time series analysis of cash holdings mean (median) 
ratio on a yearly basis to investigate the cash holdings trends in Scandinavian firms. The 
mean of cash holdings is marginally increased during pre-crisis period i.e. (2000–2007) 
from 10 to 11% and then there is a dramatic increase in the mean (median) of cash holdings 
from 11.7% (8.9%) in 2007 to 14.7% (11.1%) in 2008. In addition, the cash holdings ratio 
of the individual samples such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden are 11.23%, 11.44% and 
12.65% respectively in the pre-crisis period and significantly increase during the post-crisis 
period up to 15.63%, 12.28% and 16.24%, respectively. It is noticeable that the cash hold-
ing of Norway remains consistent and insignificantly increased in the post-crisis compared 
to Denmark and Sweden.
5  Results and discussion
We conjecture that sample firms exhibit the mean-reverting characteristics, as it’s estab-
lished by the prior studies such as Dittmar and Duchin (2010), Opler et  al. (1999). We, 
therefore, develop the following equation:
where Δ (Cash/Assetit) determines the first difference (adjustments in cash) from one 
period to the next while βΔ (Cash/Assetit−1) represent the lagged level of cash holdings.
5.1  Mean reversion of firms’ cash levels
We begin our analysis by investigating firms’ tendency to revert cash holdings level 
towards the target. Therefore, we categories firms into deciles of cash holdings to examine 
whether firms’ cash holdings level revert in the subsequent year and present the findings 
in Fig. 1. The horizontal axis of Fig. 1 shows firms with lowest cash levels or cash deficit 
display (3.4% decile) to the highest level of cash balances of (28.3% decile). The vertical 
axis shows the change in mean and median of cash holdings. The results demonstrate that 
firms adjust their cash level in the subsequent year. In addition, the firms with excess cash 
tend to reduce their cash holdings level while cash deficit firms increase their cash balance, 
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cash level of (3.09%) by cash deficit firms. These statistics demonstrate that cash holdings 
of Scandinavian firms are not persistent across excess cash firms and cash deficit firms as 
they adjust their cash level in the subsequent year.
5.2  High cash firms and cash deficit firms’ adjustment towards the target cash 
holdings
We further investigate whether high cash firms have excess cash than their target levels 
and cash deficit firms have a lower level of cash towards their target level and present the 
results in Fig. 2. As Fig. 1, the horizontal axis presents firms’ deciles allocation from the 
lowest to the highest cash level while the vertical axis determines the firms’ cash deviation 
from their estimated target levels. In addition, Fig. 2 shows that excess cash firms exceed 
the target by 23.15%, whereas low cash and cash deficit firms fall short from their targets 
by 9.92%. This evidence shows that on average Scandinavian firms’ cash level is positively 
correlated with the level of deviation from expected optimal cash level.
5.3  Firms cash rebalancing behaviour: a two‑stage model
We extend our analysis by estimating a two-stage model for controlling firms and industry 
characteristics to determine the firms’ cash rebalancing behaviour by following Opler et al. 
(1999). We estimate the firms target level of cash balance and then regress levels of actual 
cash holdings on the firms’ deviation to examine that to what extent firms adjust their cash 
holdings level towards an estimated target and present the results in Table 2.
Opler et al. (1999) have used moving average of past cash holding levels and estimate 
the optimal level of cash holdings while using firms and industry level attributes Bates 
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Fig. 1  Cash holdings in subsequent year
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between firms’ actual cash holding and the industry level attributes. Therefore, following 
Bates et al. (2009) and Opler et al. (1999), we examine the common factors that expected 
to influence the firms’ level cash holdings and develop the following model.
In addition, we investigate the magnitude of the deviations that firms adjust in 1-year 
period i.e. expected adjustment rate by the following equation.
where Δ Cash/Assets is the observed change or adjustment in the level of cash holdings 
while the right-hand side of Eq.  (3) establish the deviation from actual to target level of 
cash holdings. Moreover, α and β denote the estimated coefficients and β capture the range 
of deviation from the target level of cash holdings. We estimate the fitted values i.e. (Cash/
Assets*) from Eq. (2) and simultaneously determine each firm-years deviation from actual 
cash holdings to estimated target levels (e.g., Cash/Assets* − Cash/Assets).
Table 2 presents the cash holding regression results. Model 1 shows pooled OLS esti-
mation while model 2 extend Pooled OLS by adding year and industry dummy to con-
trol fixed effects. Most of the estimation results of model 1 and 2 are relatively similar in 
term of coefficient and level of significance. In column 3 we estimate fixed effects model 
by adding year and industry dummy. The coefficient on Tobin’s Q, leverage, NWC, Cash 
flow, Capital expenditure, dividend and industry sigma are statistically significant while 
firm size is insignificant. Model 4 estimates Eq. (3) which demonstrates that the estimated 
adjustment coefficient is statistically significant (0.374), indicating that on average firms 
(2)
Cash/Assets = f (Tobin’s Q, Leverage, NWC, Cash flow,
Capital exp, Firm size, Dividends, Industry sigma).
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Fig. 2  Cash deviation from optimal cash level
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covers less than half the gap between their actual cash level and the target level of cash 
holdings. Furthermore, these results substantiate that firms revert towards optimal cash 
level in less than 2 years.
Table 2  Testing mean reversion of cash holdings
This Table present the results from the estimation of fixed effects which calculated using standard errors 
robust to serial correlation within panels based on Eqs. (2) and (3). The dependent variable in all regres-
sions is the level of cash holdings (ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets). Tobin’s q is deter-
mined by the market to book ratio. The leverage defines as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The net 
working capital (NWC) is explained as NWC minus cash and short-term investment to total assets. Cash 
flow is calculated as the ratio of EBIT plus depreciation to total assets. Capital expenditure defines as the 
ratio of capital expenditures scaled by total assets. The firm size is determined by taking the log of firms’ 
total assets. A dummy variable is used if firms pay the dividend in a given year by taking 1 and 0 otherwise. 
The firms’ risk is measured by taking industry average standard deviation of cash flow which is considered 
as industry sigma (cash flow volatility)
***, **, *Represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Variables Panel A Panel B
Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Cash/Assets (Cash/TA* − Cash/TA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash holdings 0.131*** 0.462*** 0.225* 0.374***
(0.314) (0.542) (0.314) (0.117)
Tobin’s Q 0.451*** 0.432** 0.763* 0.372**
(0.314) (0.542) (0.314) (0.117)
Leverage − 0.521* − 0.221** − 0.054* − 0.287*
(0.171) (0.161) (0.221) (0.051)
NWC/Assets − 0.046* − 0.421* − 0.553** − 0.014**
(0.198) (0.282) (0.421) (0.211)
Cash flow 0.152** 0.219** 0.341* 0.278**
(0.412) (0.381) (0.015) (2.354)
Capital exp − 0.241** − 0.198** − 0.282* − 0.224**
(0.162) (0.152) (0.219) (0.653)
Firm size 0.493 0.412 0.381* 0.015
(0.372) (0.318) (0.271) (0.114)
Dividend-dum 0.217* 0.046* 0.421 0.551**
(0.873) (0.221) (0.341) (0.613)
Industry sigma 0.532*** 0.217*** 0.435* 0.982**
(0.291) (0.162) (0.204) (0.941)
Constant 0.382* 0.411*** 0.241** 0.608*
(0.312) (0.291) (0.162) (0.204)
Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Years dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.27 0.42 0.33 0.49
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.37 0.29 0.38
N 11,842 11,842 11,842 11,842
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5.4  Estimation cash holdings theories
The previous lines analysis is based on the trade-off model which consider the cost and 
benefits of cash holdings to determine the optimal level of cash holdings and associate with 
the firms’ mean-reverting behaviour. An alternative version is defined by financial hierar-
chy theory which argues that cash levels are associated with firms’ profitability and overall 
financial position and anticipate a balance between investment needs and internally gener-
ated finance (Myers and Majluf 1984). Moreover, the financial hierarchy theory does not 
suggest an optimal level of cash holding and predict that firms cash levels are linked with 
the change in firms’ internal resources, and firms tend to raise capital when there is lack of 
funds for potential investment opportunities.
In this section, we conduct a comparative analysis of both theoretical approaches i.e. 
trade-off and financial hierarchy to determine which theoretical model better define the 
Scandinavian perspective of cash holdings. Therefore, in the case of financial hierarchy 
approach firms’ cash level tend to directly link with the availability of firms’ internal 
funds, and as a result, the assumption of firms’ cash deviation for an optimal level i.e. 
trade-off theory version would not be significant for the future changes in firms’ cash 
level. To test these distinctive approaches of trade-off and financial hierarchy theories, 
we following Frank and Goyal (2003) and Opler et  al. (1999) and construct a varia-
ble ‘Financial deficit’. Accordingly, if the behaviour of sample firms is dominating by 
financial hierarchy theory the variable ‘financial deficit’ tends to define the significant 
part of the variation in cash holdings compared to firms’ deviation from cash holdings 
target. We, therefore, define ‘Financial deficit’ as (dividend payment of ordinary and 
preference shareholders + short term investment + change in working capital − net cash 
flow/total assets). Furthermore, to determine whether ‘financial deficit’ can capture the 
change in firms’ cash holdings, we estimate the following model.
where ‘cash’ represent the firms’ cash holdings while  cash* denotes the estimated cash 
holdings target, ‘λ’ is the firms’ SOA, ‘financial deficit’ represent the firms’ financial defi-
ciency across the sample period and vi represent firm-specific effects.
Table 3 present the partial adjustment model of fixed effects based on Eq. (4) while 
the standard error is used in addition to the year and industry dummy. The change in 
cash holdings during the subsequent year is treated as a dependent variable in each 
model. Column 1 present the regression results including ‘financial deficit’ which shows 
a significant positive coefficient (0.028) while the value of R-squared (0.05) is rela-
tively small indicating a lower explanatory power of financial deficit variable. Column 
2 presents the result of cash holdings deviations from target levels by estimating Eq. (2) 
which are smiler to the results reported in Table  2. It is noticeable that the value of 
R-squared is significantly higher than the ones shows in column 1. In column 3, we esti-
mate both measures e.g. cash deviation and the financial deficit variable. The coefficient 
on both variables i.e. ‘cash deviation’ and ‘financial deficit’ is significantly positive 
indicating that both the variables describe different attributes of firms’ cash holdings. In 
column 4, following Frank and Goyal (2003), we estimate an interaction term between 
the ‘financial deficit’ and a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the cash deviations from 
the target show excess cash level. Column 4 demonstrates that the coefficient on the 
(4)Cashit+1 − Cashit = α + (Cash
∗
it
−Cashit) + β Financial deficitit + vi + 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Table 3  Testing cash holdings theories
Panel A of this table presents the partial adjustment model of fixed effects based on Eq.  (4), while the 
standard error is used in addition to year and industry dummy. Column 1 of Panel A presents the regres-
sion results, including ‘financial deficit’, while column 2 presents the result of cash holdings deviations 
from target levels by estimating Eq. (2), smiler to results reported in Table 2. In column 3, we estimate both 
measures e.g. cash deviation and the financial deficit variable. Column 4 demonstrates that the coefficient of 
interaction variable is insignificant indicating that cash holdings of Danish, Norwegian and Swedish firms 
are more influenced by the trade-off model compared to financial hierarchy theory. Panel B of this table pre-
sents the partial adjustment model of fixed effects estimation as a robustness test of Panel A findings which 
demonstrates that cash holdings of sample firms are explained by the trade-off model and less influenced by 
the financial hierarchy theory. In column 1–5, Eq. (4) is estimated with the exclusion of ‘financial deficit’ 
variable. The industry level estimated target cash  (cash*) on a yearly basis is presented in column 1 by tak-
ing the median of industry cash holdings. Column 2 reports pooled OLS target adjustment, while column 3 
includes the fitted values by following Opler et al. (1999). The Fama–MacBeth and fixed effects models are 
estimated in column 3 and 4 respectively, while column 5 presents the dynamic estimation of Opler et al. 
(1999) model by taking fitted values of fixed effects estimator. Finally, in column 6, we examine that to 
what extent ‘financial deficit’ capture the deviation of cash holdings level
***, **, *Represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Cash/TA* − Cash/TA) 0.374*** 0.036** 0.053***
(0.117) (0.094) (0.231)
Financial deficit (dummy) 0.028** 0.087*** 0.046*
(6.134) (2.491) (5.532)
Financial deficit (excess level) 0.237
(0.104)
Constant 0.142*** 0.608* 0.131* 0.357***
(0.114) (0.204) (0.061) (0.192)
R-squared 0.05 0.49 0.32 0.27
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.38 0.23 0.21
N 11,842 11,842 11,842 11,842
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry level target adjustment 0.622***
(0.225)
Pooled OLS target adjustment 0.439**
(0.367)
Fama–MacBeth target adjustment 0.554**
(0.411)
Fixed effect target adjustment 0.497*
(0.932)




R-squared 0.61 0.37 0.44 0.29 0.48 0.04
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.31 0.37 0.23 0.41 0.01
N 11,842 11,842 11,842 11,842 11,842 11,842
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interaction variable is insignificant indicating that cash holdings of Danish, Norwegian 
and Swedish firms are more influenced by the trade-off model compared to financial 
hierarchy theory.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the partial adjustment model of fixed effects estimation as a 
robustness test of Panel A’ findings which demonstrates that cash holdings of sample firms 
are better explained by the trade-off model and less influenced by the financial hierarchy 
theory. We estimate Eq. (4) in column 1–5 with the exclusion of ‘financial deficit’ variable. 
The industry level estimated target cash  (cash*) on a yearly basis shows in column 1 by tak-
ing the median of industry cash holdings. Column 2 reports pooled OLS target adjustment 
including the fitted values by following Opler et al. (1999).
Fama–MacBeth and fixed effects models are estimated in column 3 and 4 respectively 
while column 5 presents the dynamic estimation of Opler et al. (1999) model by taking fit-
ted values of fixed effects estimator. Finally, in column 6, we examine that to what extent 
‘financial deficit’ capture the deviation of cash holdings level. The results show that coef-
ficients of cash holdings are statistically significant across model 1–5, indicating target 
adjustment behaviour of Scandinavian firms. It is noticeable that the coefficient on ‘finan-
cial deficit’ is significantly positive, however, the sample mean is comparatively low e.g. 
(0.011). Moreover, the R-squared of the financial deficit (financial hierarchy model) is 
just (0.04), indicating a less significant relevance of financial hierarchy model with cash 
holdings adjustments compared to the trade-off model which shows the higher level ofR-
squared ranging between (0.29) and (0.61) in column 1–5. Taken together, the results of 
robustness test substantiate that Scandinavian firms are better described by the trade-off 
theory compared to financial hierarchy theory and adjust the cash balance towards an opti-
mal level of cash holdings for the precautionary motive. Based on these findings we accept 
the hypothesis H1.
5.5  Country‑specific effects on cash holdings
To shed more light on the evidence whether sample firms cash holdings have significant 
country-specific effects we present the country level cross-sectional estimates of Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden in Table 4. Denmark is taken as a base country for the analysis being 
the smallest sample of the pooled observations. Column 1 presents the results of pooled 
OLS which incorporate country dummies, industry dummies and firm-specific character-
istics which indicates that firms’ cash ratios significantly change across countries. These 
results suggest a substantial country-level heterogeneity indicating that cash holdings of 
sample firms have significant country-specific attributes. In addition, the estimated coef-
ficient on Sweden is positively significant at 1% level suggesting that Swedish firms are 
better defined by trade-off theory while Norway dummy is insignificant indicating that cash 
holdings approach of Norwegian firms is supported by financial hierarchy theory. Moreo-
ver, the regression result shows that the average difference in firms’ cash holdings between 
Denmark and Sweden is 5%. This evidence is consistent with the cash ratios reported 
in Table 1. The regression analysis further shows that Scandinavian firms cash holdings 
increase with higher Tobin’s Q, cash flow, dividend and industry sigma (cash flow volatil-
ity) and decrease with higher leverage and capital expenditure. The positive coefficient on 
cash flow volatility indicates that Scandinavian firms with a higher level of volatile cash 
flows prefer to hold larger cash to minimise the estimated cost of liquidity constraints. The 
significant negative coefficient on leverage supports the argument that firms external bor-
rowing can be considered a substitute for cash holdings while NWC and firms size remain 
70 Q. A. Amin, T. Williamson 
1 3
insignificant in determining firms level cash holdings which is inconsistent with the argu-
ment that large-size firms tend to hold larger amounts of cash. We argue that the possibility 
of financial distress is linked with leverage which induces professional manager to main-
tain excess cash holdings at higher leverage level to reduce the risk of bankruptcy.
5.6  Dynamic cash holdings model
Acharya et al. (2007) argue that cash holdings regression based on firms’ level variables 
suffer inherited endogeneity as there is a possibility that cash holdings and firms’ debt may 
determine jointly. Likewise, Opler et al. (1999) report that variable which influences cash 
holdings may also be inversely affected by firms’ level of debts. Moreover, it is well docu-
mented that the presence of endogeneity makes the estimation biased and inconsistent (see, 
Table 4  Cash holdings and firms’ specific factors with country dummies (Heterogeneity)
This table presents the country level cross-sectional results across Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Denmark 
is taken as a base country for the analysis being the smallest sample of the pooled observations. Column 1 
presents the results of pooled OLS which incorporate country dummies, industry dummies and firm-spe-
cific characteristics, indicates that firms cash ratios significantly change across countries. Column 2–4 pre-
sent estimation of the country-specific attribute to capture heterogeneity across countries
***, ** and *Indicate coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively
Pooled Denmark Norway Sweden
Tobin’s Q 0.832** 0.641* 0.686** 0.641**
(0.799) (0.090) (0.449) (0.041)
Leverage − 0.013*** − 0.854* − 0.376*** − 0.427**
(0.169) (0.058) (0.023) (0.254)
NWC/Assets 0.586 0.677 − 0.533 − 0.422
(0.094) (0.787) (2.679) (0.054)
Cash flow 0.563* 0.145* 0.629* 0.602
(0.289) (1.142) (0.231) (0.645)
Capital exp − 0.606*** − 0.010** 0.557*** − 0.608*
(0.604) (0.218) (0.449) (0.204)
Firm size 0.185 0.964 0.912 0.199
(0.231) (0.319) (0.947) (0.443)
Dividend dummy 0.140** 0.831* 0.611* 0.516**
(0.018) (0.314) (0.111) (0.204)
Industry sigma 0.616*** 0.107* 0.052* 0.555**





N 11,842 2073 2545 7224
Constant 0.18** 0.24*** 0.11*** 0.29**
(0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
R-squared 0.33 0.39 0.29 0.26
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.31 0.21 0.19
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for example, Akbar et al. 2016; Ramadan El-Faitouri 2014; Wintoki et al. 2012). Accord-
ingly, the present study investigates the firms’ partial adjustment process towards the cash 
target by estimating a dynamic panel GMM to control potential source of endogeneity. 
Accordingly, the following model is developed:
where cash denotes the firm cash holdings while  cash* represents the estimated cash tar-
get. In addition, the present study examines the target cash levels by considering the firms’ 
characteristics and develop the following equation:
where Xk,it represents the vector of firms’ characteristics. In addition, following Opler et al. 
(1999) we substitute Eq. (5) into Eq. (6) and develop the following dynamic estimation:
The Eq. (7) indicates that tend to minimise the difference between expected cash levels 
(βXk,it) and actual cash level  (Cashit). Moreover, based on Eq. (7) we estimate a two-steps 
GMM model which develops a system of two simultaneous equations including one in lev-
els and the other in first difference. The GMM estimator allows to account for dynamics 
of the cash holdings and address the econometric issues such as endogeneity and simulta-
neity which are associated with panel data estimation. Furthermore, the GMM estimator 
allows us to use the lagged dependent variable and explanatory variables as instruments. 
We estimate the model with two different specifications namely, GMMa and GMMb . In the 
first model i.e. GMMa following prior studies such as Wintoki et  al. (2012) and Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004), we treat all variables as endogenous except year dummies and use their 
lags of two or more periods as instruments. In the second model i.e. GMMb we consider 
all variables as exogenous except those which are strictly endogenous (see, for example, 
Akbar et al. 2016; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Column 1 and 2 of Table 5 presents the results 
of OLS and fixed effects estimation while column 3 and 4 shows the findings of dynamic 
GMM model e.g. GMMa and GMMb for the full sample by estimating Eq.  (7). Column 
5–13 presents the results of OLS, fixed effects and GMM estimator across individual sam-
ples e.g. Demark, Norway and Sweden. Column 1 and 2 shows that the coefficients on 
the cash holdings of OLS and fixed effects estimation are (0.588) and (0.497) while SOA 
is (0.412) and (0.501) respectively, indicating that on average, Scandinavian firms’ cover 
half of their cash level adjustment ranging between (1.682) and (1.386) years. In addition, 
these findings show that sample firms actively adjust their cash level towards the target. 
Column 3 shows that p value of Arellano and Bond AR (2) of GMMa is sufficiently high 
at (0.456) therefore, the null hypothesis of instruments validity cannot be rejected. In a 
related vein, the p value of the Hansen test is also high at (0.521) thus the null hypoth-
esis that instruments as a group are exogenous cannot be rejected. Moreover, AR (2) and 
Hanson tests of individual samples e.g. Denmark, Norway and Sweden are also high such 
as (0.321), (0.467), and (0.966), (0.456), (0.332) and (0.711) respectively, which validate 
the strength of GMM estimator. On the other hand, AR (2) of GMMb is statically signifi-
cant (0.043), therefore, the null hypothesis of instruments validity is rejected while the p 
value of Hansen test is sufficiently high (0.571) thus the null hypothesis that instruments 
(5)Cashit+1 − Cashit = α + (Cash
∗
it
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as a group are exogenous cannot be rejected. The GMMa estimator better satisfied the 
assumptions of dynamic panel GMM as it fixed the autocorrelation and over-identification 
restrictions more efficiently compared to GMMb and substantiate the health of instruments 
(J-statistics). We, therefore, discuss the findings of GMMa and compare its results with 
pooled OLS and fixed effects models. In addition, the GMMa estimator results in column 3 
show that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is (0.572) while SOA and half-
life period are (0.428) and (1.619 years), respectively. These results show that the SOA of 
Scandinavian firms is significantly lower than US firms (0.540) document by Orlova and 
Rao (2018) while it’s marginally close to the global sample of Dittmar and Duchin (2010) 
who report SOA ranging between (0.353) and (0.433).2
Furthermore, GMM estimator results indicate that the SOA of individual samples e.g., 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden are (0.412), (0.481), (0.417), respectively while half-life 
periods are (1.682), (1.444), and (1.662) years, respectively. More specifically, the SOA 
of Norwegian firms (0.481) significantly greater than Danish (0.412) and Swedish firms 
(0.417), indicating that the adjustment costs and off-target costs of Norwegian firms are 
marginally close to each other which lead to quicker deviation towards the target. In addi-
tion, the stable cash holdings level of Norwegian firms leads to a faster SOA as reported 
in Table 1. Moreover, the half-life period of Norwegian firms is significantly shorter than 
other samples, validating its quicker SOA and stable cash holdings levels compared to 
other samples.
Additionally, Bond (2002) reveals that accurate and consistent estimation of lagged 
dependent variable generally lies somewhere between the ordinary least square and fixed 
effects estimations. Our results provide interesting insights as the estimated coefficient 
on GMMa of full sample (0.572), lies between the estimated coefficient on pooled OLS 
(0.588) and fixed effects model (0.497) which is corroborated with Bond (2002) prediction. 
This evidence indicates that Scandinavian firms rebalance their cash holdings by dynamic 
adjustment toward the cash target.
5.7  Estimation of cross‑sectional variation in SOA
We extend our analysis by examining the cross-sectional variation in cash holdings level 
to determine whether SOA is heterogeneous across Scandinavian firms and presents the 
results in Table 6. In the next lines analysis, we present substantial evidence of heteroge-
neity in SOA based on six factors such as high cash, medium cash, low cash level, active/
passive cash management, use of leverage financing and the level of investment opportu-
nities. At first, we classified firms based on the relatively high, medium and low level of 
excess cash. We examine whether SOA is associated with the different level of cash hold-
ings which leads to the different levels of adjustment cost and off-target cost. The excess 
cash is determined as (Cash–Cash*), while  Cash* is estimated by following fixed effects 
estimation of Opler et al. (1999). Moreover, following Dittmar and Duchin (2010) dummy 
variables are generated with three different classifications i.e. high, medium and low cash 
level and interact with the lagged dependent variable specified in Eq. 7. For example, the 
2 The coefficient on λ captures the magnitude of the difference between target and actual cash levels that 
typical firms generally close each year. Following prior studies, we determine SOA (λ) by subtracting the 
estimated coefficient (δ0) on the lagged cash holdings from 1 (e.g., 1 − δ0). Moreover, the estimates of SOA 
are explained in terms of the half-life period which is defined as the time required to cover half of the dis-
tance from opening balance of cash to the target level.
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Table 6  Estimation of cross-sectional variation in SOA
This table presents the cross-sectional variation in SOA with the estimation of dynamic GMM estimator. 
Following Dittmar and Duchin (2010), the dummy variables are generated with three different classifica-
tions i.e. high, medium and low cash level, and interact with the lagged dependent variable in Eq. 7. For 
example, the firm-years with excess cash e.g. (high cash dummy = 1), includes those firms which have high 
cash in the top third of the sample, while firm-years with medium level excess cash e.g. (medium cash 
dummy = 1), includes those firms which are ranked in the middle third of the observations. The bottom 
third of the observations with the low-level cash level e.g. (low cash dummy = 1) is defined as low cash 
firms and present the result in column 1. Column 2 shows median of industry level cash to determine firms 
target level of cash holdings by taking high excess cash firms (high cash dummy = 1), medium excess cash 
firms (medium cash dummy = 1), and low excess cash firms (low cash dummy = 1), respectively, e.g. those 
firms whose cash levels are above or below the industry median, respectively, while the observations having 
neither too high nor too low cash level, are treated as medium cash firms. Column 4–6 shows the estimation 
of SOA where the firms are involved in making a dividend payment, use of debt finance and by engaging in 
greater investment level, respectively with the classification of high, medium and low level
Dependent variable EX-Cash EX-Cash (Ind) Active Leverage Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High cash-dummy 0.498*** 0.529** 0.561** 0.503* 0.561**
(0.342) (0.224) (0.347) (0.521) (0.055)
Medium cash-dummy 0.603*** 0.587*** 0.619* 0.621*** 0.603**
(0.965) (0.432) (0.251) (0.234) (0.641)
Low cash-dummy 0.641** 0.704*** 0.659*** 0.657*** 0.703***
(0.831) (0.289) (0.027) (0.328) (0.637)
Tobin’s Q 0.383** 0.646* 0.084** 0.311** 0.621**
(0.719) (0.094) (0.403) (0.385) (0.244)
Leverage − 0.805* − 0.454** − 0.052*** − 0.292*** − 0.439**
(0.487) (0.058) (0.201) (0.599) (0.141)
NWC/Assets − 0.172 − 0.677* − 0.115 0.012 − 0.553**
(0.029) (0.787) (0.221) (0.127) (0.261)
Cash flow 0.104*** − 0.187** 0.421 0.142** 0.094***
(0.399) (0.059) (0.261) (0.145) (0.245)
Capital exp − 0.225** − 0.486* − 0.984 0.016** 0.261*
(0.283) (0.118) (0.134) (0.096) (0.651)
Firm size 0.152 0.432 − 0.281 0.001 0.116**
(0.725) (0.375) (0.056) (0.638) (0.414)
Dividend dummy 1.375* 0.251*** 0.019** 0.214** 0.477***
(0.191) (0.046) (0.312) (0.099) (0.331)
Industry sigma 0.025* 0.216** 0.131** 0.324** 0.482*
(0.256) (0.451) (0.161) (0.461) (0.183)
SOA (high cash firm) 0.502 0.471 0.439 0.497 0.439
SOA (medium cash firm) 0.397 0.413 0.381 0.379 0.397
SOA (low cash firm) 0.359 0.296 0.341 0.343 0.297
N 11,842 11,842 11,842 11,842 11,842
AR (1) test (p value) 0.321 0.041 0.673 0.832 0.09
AR (2) test (p value) 0.673 0.735 0.234 0.567 0.603
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.567 0.754 0.145 0.367 0.621
Difference in hansen test 0.371 0.256 0.431 0.367 0.563
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firm-years with excess cash e.g. (high cash dummy = 1), includes those firms which have 
high cash in the top third of the sample. Likewise, firm-years with medium level excess 
cash e.g. (medium cash dummy = 1), includes those firms which are ranked in the middle 
third of the observations. Finally, the bottom third of the observations with the low-level 
cash level e.g. (low cash dummy = 1) is defined as low cash firms. We expect a slow SOA 
to the cash deficit firms which is associated with higher adjustment cost owing to the finan-
cial frictions. Column 1 of Table 6 shows the results of GMM estimator which determine 
cash level deviation towards the target. The results show that high excess cash firms associ-
ate with higher SOA (0.502 = 1 − 0.498) compared to the firms with low excess cash firms 
(0.359 = 1 − 0.641). These findings show that it’s costlier for low cash firms to rebalance 
their cash levels towards target compared to high cash firms. These results are corroborated 
with the firms’ behaviour observed in Fig. 1 which demonstrate that the high excess cash 
firms tend to reduce their cash holdings level while the low cash and cash deficit firms 
increase their cash balance, however, excess cash firms increase their cash level more than 
the decrease in cash level by cash deficit firms. These findings validate the hypothesis H2 
that difference in cash levels and adjustment costs among firms lead to different levels of 
SOA. Column 2 shows median of industry-level cash to determine firms target level of 
cash holdings by taking high excess cash firms (high cash dummy = 1) and low excess cash 
firms (low cash dummy = 1), respectively e.g. those firms whose cash levels are above or 
below the industry median, respectively while the observations having neither too high nor 
too low cash level are treated as medium cash firms e.g. (medium cash dummy = 1). In the 
next step, we interact these dummy variables with the lagged dependent variable in Eq. (7) 
and present the results in column 2. The findings demonstrate that firms with high excess 
cash than industry median show greater SOA (0.471 = 1 − 0.529) compared to low excess 
cash firms (0.296 = 1 − 0.704). These findings substantiate that high adjustment cost of low 
cash firms and cash deficit firms slow down their SOA compared to high cash firms.
Going forward, we endeavour to examine how actively Scandinavian firms adjust their 
cash levels by using debt financing and the higher level of investment opportunities. We, 
therefore, first examine the change in firms’ excess cash holdings:
where ‘cash’ is the firms’ cash holdings while  cash* is representing the estimate of cash 
holdings target, EX_Cash is excess cash holdings estimated by following fixed effects esti-
mator of Opler et al. (1999). Moreover, by rearranging Eq. 8 we develop fowling equation:
In addition, following the seminal study by Dittmar and Duchin (2010), we describe the 
following equations:
‘Active’ represents the measurement of the change in firms unexpected cash holdings 
characteristics towards the change in the actual cash level while ‘Passive’ denotes the 
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measurement of adjustment in unexpected cash holdings as a result of the change in cash 
holdings target. Following Eq. (9a) and (9b) we develop a dummy variable which is equal 
to 1 if  Activeit > Passiveit and 0 otherwise, to determine how actively a firm manages its 
cash levels. The analysis shows that 81% of the sample observations relate to the Active 
group, indicating that the majority of sample firms tend to actively adjust their cash lev-
els. Next, we interact the dummy variables with the lagged dependent variable in Eq. (7) 
and estimate whether Scandinavian firms are actively managing the cash holdings. Col-
umn 3 shows that SOA differs across sub-groups e.g. Active and Passive cash manage-
ment. The findings reveal that the firms with Active cash management display higher SOA 
(0.439 = 1 − 0.561) compared with those who do not actively rebalance their cash holdings 
i.e. low cash firms (0.341 = 1 − 0.659). Therefore, these findings demonstrate that active 
cash holdings management associated with the firms’ higher SOA and lower adjustment 
costs.
Moreover, following Dittmar and Duchin (2010), we further investigate whether firms 
actively rebalance their cash levels in the case of leverage finance and greater investment 
level. In column 4 and 5, we categorise firms based on leverage ratios, defined as the ratio 
of total debts scaled by total assets and firms’ investment, measured as capital expenditure 
to total assets, respectively. Further, we categorised firms as (high-dummy = 1), medium 
(medium-dummy = 1), and low (low-dummy = 1) levels of debts ratio and investment in the 
given year, in the top, medium and bottom third of industry average mean, respectively and 
interact these dummy variables with lagged dependent variable based on Eq. (7).
The findings in columns 4–5 demonstrate that SOA of firms with higher leverage 
finance and with greater investment level are (0.497) and (0.439), respectively, which are 
faster than the SOA of lower leverage finance firms (0.343) and small investment firms 
(0.297). The potential explanation of these findings is that the professional managers need 
to accommodate debts re-payments and future investment needs, therefore, they required 
higher cash level with faster SOA towards the target cash holdings. These findings sub-
stantiate that SOA is heterogeneous across sample firms which corroborated with the study 
results of Dittmar and Duchin (2010).
5.8  Impact of financial constraints on SOA
To gain further insight into the factors affecting SOA, we examine cash holding SOA 
across FC and UC firms by categorizing firm-years observations based on four indices i.e. 
dividend payment, firm size, growth and interest coverage ratio and present the results in 
Table 7. Panel A of Table 7 demonstrates the cross-classification of firm-years observa-
tions indicating that there are (8715), (7469), (7091), and (6470) firms–years of FC firms 
across four constraints criteria respectively while (3127), (4373), (4751), and (5372) firm-
years of UC firms respectively. In addition, panel B of Table 7 presents yearly cash hold-
ings across FC and UC firms. The mean cash holdings of FC firms are ranging between 
13.1 and 14.9% while cash holdings are varying between 10.5 and 12.3% for UC firms 
across different constraints indices indicating that FC firms have higher cash holdings than 
UC firms.
We further examine the effectiveness of firms’ cash management policies against finan-
cial constraints by categorizing firms based on four different constraints indices and deter-
mine their impact on SOA. Column 1 and 2 of Table 8 shows that the estimated coefficient 
on FC and UC firms based on dividend criteria is (0.557) and (0.633) respectively while 
the SOA of FC firms (0.443) is faster than the SOA (0.367) of UC firms, consequently, the 
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half-life period of FC firms (1.564 years) is shorter than UC firms (1.888 years). Based 
on these findings we accept the hypothesis H2. The quicker SOA of FC firms indicates 
that professional managers hold larger cash to meet their precautionary motive and less 
concerned about profitable investment opportunities. In addition, we argue that FC firms 
endeavour to cover their transaction cost for unconditional liquidity thus behave more sen-
sitive for optimal cash level. Therefore, FC firms quickly deviate their cash level towards 
the optimal cash holdings compared to UC firms. These findings validate the hypothesis:H2 
Table 7  Financial constraint criteria
Panel A of this table shows the firms yearly cross-classification for the four constraints criteria i.e. dividend, 
size, growth and interest coverage ratio to categorize firms as financially constrained or unconstrained. 
Panel B reports the summary statics of cash holdings across financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. The sample firms include non-financial listed firms of France and German firms over the period 
2000–2016
Cash holdings Dividend Firm size Growth Interest cover-
age
FC UC FC UC FC UC FC UC
Panel A. Cross classification of constraint allocation
(1) Dividend payment
 Constrained firms (FC) 8715
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 3127
(2) Firm size
 Constrained firms (FC) 5996 1473 7469
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 2719 1654 4373
(3) Growth
 Constrained firms (FC) 5427 1664 4609 2482 7091
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 3288 1463 2860 1891 4751
(4) Interest coverage
 Constrained firms (FC) 4465 2005 4189 2281 4175 2295 6470
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 4250 1122 3280 2092 2916 2456 5372
Cash holdings N Mean Median SD
Panel B. Summary statistics of cash holdings 
across constraint criteria
(1) Dividend payment
 Constrained firms (FC) 8715 0.146 0.095 0.178
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 3127 0.108 0.072 0.131
(2) Firm size
 Constrained firms (FC) 7469 0.142 0.092 0.152
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 4373 0.112 0.081 0.149
(3) Growth
 Constrained firms (FC) 7091 0.131 0.089 0.145
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 4751 0.123 0.083 0.131
(4) Interest coverage
 Constrained firms (FC) 6470 0.149 0.098 0.151
 Unconstrained firms (UC) 5372 0.105 0.07 0.113
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that SOA of FC firms is more sensitive to optimal cash levels than UC firms. Further, the 
FC firms tend to avoid the cost of cash shortfall, therefore, prefer to hold larger cash for 
quick adjustment of cash holdings towards the optimal level. Column 3 and 4 exhibit the 
cash holdings and SOA across firm size criteria. The SOA of FC firms (0.408) is faster than 
Table 8  SOA’s across financially constrained (FC) and unconstrained (UC) firms
This table present the estimation of SOA across financially constrained and unconstrained firms based on 
four constraint criteria e.g. dividend, size, growth and interest coverage ratio. All model estimations based 
on two-step system GMM estimator. Arellano-Bond, first-order autocorrelation AR (1), second-order auto-
correlation AR (2) and Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions have conducted to examine the valid-
ity and strength of instruments. The null hypothesis of Arellano-Bond AR (2) test instruments validity by 
examining whether it’s correlated with the error term, while the null hypothesis of the Hansen test suggests 
that instruments as a group are exogenous. Wald f-statistic reflect the difference in the coefficient across dif-
ferent groups
***, **, *Represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Variables Dividend payment Firm size Growth Interest coverage
FC UC FC UC FC UC FC UC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9)
Cash hold-
ings
0.557** 0.633* 0.592** 0.644** 0.489*** 0.551** 0.504* 0.533**
(0.576) (0.152) (0.054) (0.791) (0.231) (0.029) (2.679) (0.719)
Tobin’s Q 0.433** 0.725** 0.602* 0.221** 0.606*** 0.522 0.965* 0.805*
(0.917) (0.35) (0.645) (0.102) (0.604) (0.427) (0.319) (0.487)
Leverage − 0.159** − 0.513 − 1.463 − 0.521** − 0.231* − 0.384* 0.831 − 0.176**
(4.358) (0.957) (1.868) (0.006) (0.249) (1.122) (0.314) (0.553)
NWC/
Assets
− 0.641* − 0.592 − 0.832** 0.214* − 0.104* − 0.435** 0.107* − 0.269**
(0.094) (0.613) (0.799) (0.031) (0.136) (0.062) (0.063) (0.915)
Cash flow 0.854* 0.657** 0.013* 0.365 0.776** 0.108* 0.155*** 0.211*
(0.058) (0.104) (0.169) (0.137) (1.174) (0.895) (0.842) (7.106)
Capital exp − 0.586** − 0.137** 3345 − 0.191* − 0.155** − 0.297** − 0.233*** 0.654
(0.094) (3.771) (0.947) (0.025) (0.268) (0.898) (0.7.44) (0.348)
Firm size 0.563* 0.616** 0.185 ** 0.521* 0.125 0.611 0.733 − 0.617
(0.289) (0.204) (0.231) (0.271) (0.403) (0.111) (0.235) (0.201)
Dividend 
dummy
0.686** 0.324** 0.140** 0.543 0.111* 0.052* 0.575* 0.118
(0.449) (0.104) (0.018) (0.583) (0.431) (0.154) (0.576) (0.322)
Industry 
sigma
− 0.876* 0.399* 0.616*** − 0.054 0.384** 0.048* 0.094* 0.347
(0.023) (3.225) (0.791) (2.427) (0.521) (0.111) (0.042) (0.362)
N 8715 3127 7469 4373 7091 4751 6470 5372
Wald f-stat 2.085 3.651 1.196 4.024 5.393 2.251 3.262 4.571
SOA 0.443 0.367 0.408 0.356 0.511 0.449 0.496 0.467
Half Life 1.564 1.888 1.698 1.947 1.356 1.543 1.397 1.484
AR (1) test 
(p value)
0.041 0.432 0.543 0.734 0.092 0.063 0.022 0.062
AR (2) test 
(p value)
0.462 0.632 0.436 0.673 0.332 0.441 0.354 0.463
Hansen-J 
test




0.221 0.431 0.819 0.192 0.225 0.422 0.526 0.391
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UC firms (0.356). Accordingly, small size firms tend to adjust their cash level more quickly 
towards their optimal cash target due to the limited access to external financing. Moreover, 
small size firms have fewer financial resources compared to large-size firms, therefore, pre-
fer to maintain optimal cash level by a quicker SOA towards the target to avoid financial 
distress. Furthermore, small firms suffer agency conflict and the higher level of information 
asymmetries which induce professional managers for faster SOA towards the target level. 
Our results demonstrate that it is more expensive for small firms to deviate from their cash 
holdings target compared to large firms due to the high financial constraints.
Column 5 and 6 shows that the SOA of low growth firms (0.511) is quicker than the 
SOA of high growth firms (0.449), and similarly, model 7 and 8 indicate that the SOA 
of lower interest coverage firms (0.495) is marginally greater than SOA of high-interest 
coverage firms (0.467). Therefore, FC firms swiftly manage their cash target compared 
to UC firms indicating that it is expensive for FC firms to operate below the optimal 
levels of cash holdings. Overall, these findings substantiate a direct association between 
financial constraints, firms’ cash holdings and its SOA. Accordingly, maintenance of an 
optimal level of cash balance is deemed to be a significant concern for the managers of 
FC firms as it saves them from transactional cost and help to minimize the default risk. 
Based on these findings we accept the hypothesis H3.
5.9  Do a regime shift in the firms demand function of cash holding 
during the post‑crisis period
The global financial crisis affects the firms’ cash management strategies and raised the 
importance of firms’ liquid assets management. Santos (2011) reveals that the bank 
credit reduces during the financial crisis which increases the firms cost of external 
financing. Therefore, in the case of the inefficient capital market firms prefer to hold 
more cash for the transactional and precautionary motive. To examine the influence of 
exogenous shock on cash holdings, we incorporate the impact of the global financial 
crisis (2008–2009). Accordingly, we investigate the firms cash holdings management 
across pre-crisis (2000–2007) and post-crisis (2008–2016) to determine whether there 
is a regime shift in firms demands function of cash holding in response to the financial 
crisis.
We categories observations across each country to investigate the impact of finan-
cial crisis on each sample. Column 1 of Table 9 presents the estimation of pooled OLS 
model while in column 2 the log-linear model is estimated for the full sample. A dummy 
variable e.g. ‘post-crisis dummy’ is included in model 1 and 2 to investigate whether a 
regime change in the firms’ cash demand function and allow intercept shifts during the 
post-crisis period. We expect that the coefficient on post-crisis dummy would positively 
significant if there is an increase in cash holdings ‘during the post-crisis period for exog-
enous factors which are not related to the firms’ characteristics. The results show that the 
coefficients on post-crisis dummy variable in model 1 and 2 are significantly positive e.g. 
(0.553) and (0.237), respectively indicating a sharp upward shift in firms demands function 
of cash holdings. These results show that the global financial crisis systematically changed 
the firms’ cash holdings target which describes that a regime changed in the Scandina-
vian firms’ demand function during the post-crisis period. Moreover, these trends show an 
increased cash holding during the post-crisis period which more likely to induces profes-
sional managers towards a quicker SOA due to the exogenous shock.
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In column 3–10, we extend the model 1 by adding an interaction term variable of the 
post-crisis period (2008–2016) which interact with all regressors. We take 1 if firm years 
fall in pre-crisis (e.g., 2000–2007) and 0 for post-crisis (e.g., 2008–2016). This interaction 
variable determines whether the difference in intercept is associated with the change in 
the relationship between cash holdings and firms’ characteristics and allow for a shift in 
slope and intercept during the post-crisis. Column 3 shows that during post-crisis there is a 
significant increase in industry sigma (0.631) compared to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, 
the coefficient on industry sigma is also increased for the individual samples in column 
6, 8 and 10. This result reflects that firms prefer to hold more cash to mitigate cash flow 
risk during the post-crisis period. Further, results show that the intercepts are significantly 
increased across all samples which change the slope coefficients in the post-crisis period. 
These results demonstrate that a significant part of increased cash holdings during post-
crisis is not explained by the relationship between firms’ internal characteristics and cash 
holdings which deems to be an undefined shift in the firms’ demand function due to exog-
enous shock which is not related to firm characteristics.
5.10  Do firms SOA accelerate during the post‑crisis?
In the line of the previous analysis, we examine whether Scandinavian firms’ SOA accelerates 
during the post-crisis due to the increase in cash holdings. Therefore, distinct from Table 9, 
instead of using dummy a variable and interaction variable for the post-crisis period, we split 
the firm-years into the pre-crisis period (2000–2007) and the post-crisis period (2008–2016). 
We apply the two-steps system GMM estimator which provide more efficient and consistent 
estimation after controlling dynamic endogeneity and present the findings in Table 10. The 
results demonstrate that p value of Arellano and Bond AR (2) and the p value of Hansen test 
are sufficiently high across all models, therefore, the null hypothesis of instruments valid-
ity and instruments exogeneity cannot be rejected. Moreover, Wald f-statistic reflecting the 
difference in the coefficient across different groups. The results show that the SOA of Scan-
dinavian firms (full sample) in the pre-crisis increase from (0.389) to (0.491) during the post-
crisis period indicating that Scandinavian firms exhibit quicker SOA during the post-crisis 
period. These findings strongly support the hypothesis H4 . Column 3 and 4 shows that SOA 
of Danish firms in the pre-crisis increase from (0.411) to (0.512) during the post-crisis period 
indicating a quicker SOA of Danish firms during the post-crisis period. In the case of Nor-
wegian firms, the SOA is marginally increased from (0.446) to (0.451) during the post-crisis 
period reflecting that Norwegian firms are not sensitive towards the financial crisis. This evi-
dence is corroborating with cash holdings trends of Norwegian firms report in Table 1, indi-
cating that cash holdings of Norwegian firms remain consistent during the post-crisis period. 
Finally, SOA of Swedish firms is (0.369) in pre-crisis and increased up to (0.401) during the 
post-crisis period. Taken together, Scandinavian firms except Norway accelerate SOA during 
the post-crisis period by reason of their sensitivity towards exogenous shocks.
6  Concluding remarks
We investigate the firms’ specific attributes that determine the difference in speed of adjust-
ment (SOA) towards the cash holdings target in the Scandinavian countries: Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden. Our analysis differs from previous empirical research on various 
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counts and contributes to the growing literature of ownership structure in several notable 
ways. The present study is the first to examine cash holdings SOA in the Scandinavian 
firms’ context. Our results demonstrate that Scandinavian firms are not persistent across 
high cash firms and cash deficit firms and adjust their cash level in the subsequent year. In 
addition, we report that firms exhibit mean reversion towards their cash holdings level and 
tend to actively correct their deviations for optimal levels. The Scandinavian firms on aver-
age covers less than half the gap between their actual cash level and the target level of cash 
holdings and revert towards optimal cash level in less than 2 years.
Our findings add substantial evidence of country-specific attributes that significantly 
influence the firms’ cash holdings. For example, the SOA of Norwegian firms is signifi-
cantly larger than the Danish and Swedish firms due to the stable cash holdings level across 
the sample period. Also, we report that the adjustment costs and off-target costs of Nor-
wegian firms are marginally close to each other which lead to quicker deviation towards 
the target. Additionally, the half-life period of Norwegian firms is significantly lower than 
other samples, reflecting their quicker SOA and stable cash holdings levels across the sam-
ple period.
Our results show that the firms’ SOA is heterogeneous across sample firms, therefore, 
the SOA of the firms with higher leverage finance and greater investment level is faster 
than lower leverage finance and smaller investment firms as the professional managers 
need to manage cash for debts repayments and potential investment opportunities. Further, 
the firms’ active cash holdings management associated with the higher SOA and lower 
adjustment cost. The Scandinavian firms’ SOA determined mainly by adjustment cost in 
addition to firms’ capacity and initiative to rebalance the cash level towards the targets. We 
argue that an exogenous shock, financial constraints, agency issues and information asym-
metry trigger the intensity of adjustment cost.
Our analysis substantiates that financially constrained (FC) firms endeavour to cover 
their transaction cost for unconditional liquidity thus behave more sensitive for optimal 
cash level. We report that FC firms quickly deviate their cash towards the target compared 
to unconstrained (UC) firms which in turn increase the SOA of FC firms than UC firms. 
We thus conclude that cash flow volatility and financial constraints determine the level 
of cash holdings of FC firms. Moreover, we argue that the professional managers of FC 
firms are more concerned about cash shortfall and prefer to maintain an optimal level of 
cash holdings compared to UC firms as it’s costlier for FC firms to maintain cash holdings 
below the optimal level.
Our results show that Scandinavian firms prefer to hold more cash in the post-crisis 
period for the transactional and precautionary motive which induces professional managers 
towards a quicker SOA. We further report a sharp upward shift in firms’ demands function 
of cash holdings which describe that a regime changed in the Scandinavian firms’ cash 
holdings during the post-crisis period which leads to faster SOA. Finally, we empirically 
test the significance of trade-off and financial hierarchy theories and report that Scandina-
vian firms deviate their cash holdings towards the optimal level thus better described by the 
trade-off theory. We provide valuable insights for key stakeholders i.e., shareholders direc-
tors, and professional managers by presenting a wider dimension of cash holdings SOA 
across different economic periods and financial constraint criteria. Our findings add value 
to the growing literature by providing an obstinate platform for future studies to analyse the 
distinctive aspects of SOA across developed and emerging market.
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